

*The World and the Individual*. Second Series. "Nature, Man, and the Moral Order." By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. (Aberdeen Gifford Lectures.) New York: Macmillan, 1901. Pp. xvii., 480.

THIS volume, the author tells us, is more practical in its aim than its predecessor. "The previous discussion dealt with the Theory of Being; the aim of what is to come shall be a doctrine about Life" (p. 4). The first Lecture, "The Recognition of Facts," after some admirable remarks on the relation of philosophy to life, recapitulates the view taken in the First Series, that "what we experience is, in one aspect, always our own will to be compelled by facts" (p. 30). It is no doubt the case, as Dr. Royce points out, that we can never be out of harmony with facts except in so far as our own nature leads us to postulate something inconsistent with them. But it appears from the fuller statement previously given (*cf.* First Series, pp. 389, 390) that Dr. Royce finds in this a ground for a belief in an ultimate and supreme harmony between our will and reality. And this does not seem a legitimate inference. If my will had no relation to the facts before me, I could not be dissatisfied. But it does not follow from this that my will will ever be in that special relation to the facts which produces satisfaction.

The second Lecture is entitled "The Linkage of Facts". Here we deal with the distinction between the World of Description and the World of Appreciation. The World of Description is that which we form when we view facts "as if the only purpose which they could fulfil was the purpose of being discriminable" (p. 98). This world also is "anybody's world". From whatever individual standpoint we may start, we shall come to the same result (p. 99). And it is therefore "abstract and inadequate" (p. 101).

"The true world," on the other hand, "the World of Values or of Appreciation, as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a world of Selves, forming in the unity of their systems One Self" (p. 106). And its unity "determines not merely what is the same from many points of view, but what is uniquely present, once for all, from the divine point of view, as the one true Order of things" (p. 102).

The distinction here indicated is, no doubt, of great importance. But Dr. Royce's terminology tends to suggest an absolute gulf where, as it seems to me, there is in reality a continuous development. Between the abstract universality of mathematics and the full individuality recognised, if not completely expounded, by such a philosophy as Dr. Royce's, or Hegel's, there surely lie many stages which give gradually increasing recognition to individuality. And "the one true Order of things," while it is certainly more than "what is the same from many points of view," is not so

much a fresh conception as a higher form of the same conception.

The rest of the lecture is largely occupied by the development of the view that the "best single word for expressing what is essential to a lawful order in the world of facts is the term Series" (p. 72). In the World of Appreciation the series are such that "every fact has its next-following fact". In the World of Description, on the other hand, a fresh fact can always be inserted between any two facts—or when this is not empirically possible, we postulate the intermediaries we cannot observe (pp. 98, 107).

All order may no doubt be expressed as a Series. But is it worth while to do so? Everything which makes a conception of order adequate or inadequate as an expression of reality is left untouched by such an expression. If reality is conceived as a mechanical aggregate, or as an organism, or as the *Civitas Dei*, it could be said to form a series. But the important point is to know what relations are predicated, in each case, between the points forming the series, and it is just this which the conception of series ignores—as is natural with a conception taken originally from mathematics.

The third Lecture deals with the Temporal and the Eternal. Dr. Royce first expounds the conception of the Specious Present, as applied to the consciousness of finite individuals. The lives of finite beings, he tells us, must be considered as being in a temporal order, because every finite being is striving towards an Other, which involves time (p. 134). Nevertheless, the Other towards which such a being strives is the whole of which the striving being is a part, and this leads on to the assertion that "this same temporal whole is, when regarded in its wholeness, an Eternal order. And I mean by this assertion nothing whatever, but that the whole real content of this temporal order, whether it is viewed from any one temporal instant as past or as present or as future, is at once known, *i.e.*, is consciously experienced as a whole by the Absolute. And I use this expression *at once* in the very sense in which we before used it when we pointed out that to your own consciousness, the whole musical phrase may be and often is known at once, despite the fact that each member of the musical succession, when taken as the temporally present one, excludes from its own temporal instant the other members of the sequence, so that they are either no longer or not yet, at the instant when this element is temporally the present one" (p. 138).

An adequate discussion of this most interesting theory is impossible here. I wish only to make two comments. The first is that the Specious Present of the Absolute contains the future as well as the past, in opposition to the view held by Mr. Bradley, by which "the 'now' contains merely the process of present turning into past" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 41).

The second point is that this view really asserts the absolute

validity of Time, and leaves no place for Eternity at all. If I understood Dr. Royce rightly, he holds that even for the Absolute the distinction of past, present, and future really exists. Even from the standard of the Absolute, therefore, some events are no longer, and others not yet. It is true that the Absolute is directly conscious of what is no longer and what is not yet. But that does not make them real at the moment at which the Absolute is conscious of them—for then they would respectively still be, and already be, which Dr. Royce has denied to be the case. What then is eternal? Nothing but events, apparently, since Dr. Royce speaks of nothing else. But not the events of which the Absolute is conscious, for the reasons I have just given. Not, finally, the event of the Absolute's consciousness. For that must change every moment, since every moment it regards as present something which it had previously regarded as future, and regards as past something which it had, in the previous moment, regarded as present.

Lecture IV. ("Physical and Social Reality") contains a very interesting study of the social element in our view of nature, which is summed up in the assertion that "the so-called axiom of the unvarying character of the laws of nature is no self-evident truth, is not even at once an empirically established and a universal generalisation, and possesses its present authority because of the emphasis that our social interests give to the discovery of uniform laws where we can discover them" (p. 195).

If among our "social interests" be included our interest in understanding the universe, it is no doubt true that, in so far as we do not attempt to understand the universe, we do not need the axiom of the uniformity of nature. But this would also be the case with every other truth, including the law of contradiction, and Dr. Royce certainly does not hold that all truth depends on our social interests in the way in which the uniformity of nature depends on them.

If "social interests" is taken in a narrower sense, I do not think the proposition can be maintained. No doubt the world would be inconvenient if there were no uniform laws to be found in it. But would that be all. Would it not also be contradictory? And then the uniformity of nature can scarcely be said to be a merely social interest. That uniformity is not the whole truth, and is therefore not quite true. But an approximation to the truth is not quite the same as a merely practical expedient.

Lecture V. deals with the Interpretation of Nature. Dr. Royce points out that the laws of reversible processes are valid only for Matter as such. "But the other laws, the laws of the irreversible processes, are, in their most general type, common to Matter and Mind, to the physical and the moral world" (p. 218). To these latter much greater importance is to be attached. "We know that Nature, as it were, *tolerates* our mathematical formulas. We do not know that she would not equally well tolerate many other such

formulas instead of these. But we do know, meanwhile, that the processes called by us growth and decay are facts as genuinely real as any natural facts whatever " (p. 225).

This is followed by the development of a theory which seems to me to be of great novelty and importance. Those systems which hold that all centres of reality must be conscious beings have generally considerable difficulty in explaining the finite centres of reality behind that inorganic nature which behaves so differently from our bodies. Dr. Royce suggests that " the actually fluent inner experience, which our hypothesis attributes to inorganic Nature would be a finite experience of an extremely august temporal span, so that a material region of the inorganic world would be to us the phenomenal sign of the presence of at least one fellow creature who took, perhaps, a billion years to complete a moment of his consciousness, so that where we saw, in the signs given us of his presence, only monotonous permanence of fact, he, in his inner life, found momentarily significant change (p. 228). " If . . . personal individuality is an essentially ethical category, then a new person exists whenever, within a conscious process of a given time-span, intercommunication with the rest of Nature results in the appearance of processes significant enough to express themselves in new ideals, and in a new unification of experience in terms of these ideals " (p. 229).

" Meanwhile, our hypothesis supposes that, in the case of the animals, we may well be dealing not with beings who are rational in our own time-span, nor yet with beings who are irrational. The rational being with whom you deal when you observe an animal's dimmer hints of rationality, may be phenomenally represented rather by the race as a whole than by any one individual. In that case, this individual animal is no rational person, but he may well be, so to speak, a temporally brief section of a person, whose time-span of consciousness is far longer than ours " (p. 232).

The next two lectures are devoted to the doctrine of the Self. Dr. Royce reminds us of the distinction drawn in the previous volume between Internal and External meaning, and declares that primarily " the contrast of Self and not-Self comes to us as the contrast between the Internal and the External meaning of this present moment's purpose " (p. 272). The significance of the Self is teleological. " By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this Intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with them—by this, and not by the possession of any Soul-Substance, I am defined and created a Self " (p. 276). And again, " in our present form of human consciousness, the true Self of any individual man is not a datum, but an ideal " (p. 287).

This is followed by an attempt to show how a part of a Self may, in time, assume a separate Selfhood, which it did not previously possess. It would seem that the new Self may remain a part of the original larger Self, or (if I understand the theory

rightly) may become independent of that original Self. I must confess that I entirely fail in attaching any meaning to the inclusion of one Self in another, or to the transformation into a Self of something which previously was not one. Nor do I see how Dr. Royce can be so confident as he apparently is that the genesis of the Self in time is not inconsistent with its immortality when produced. Even if, as he says, all facts have teleological relations with the Absolute (p. 322) how are we, on such a theory, to be convinced that the end of each finite Self is not to efface itself and vanish as a means to something else?

Lecture VIII. deals with the Moral Order. The following sentences seem to give the fundamental aspects of the doctrine put forward. "To seek anything but the Absolute itself is, indeed, even for the most perverse Self, simply impossible. All life is looking for God, however base the forms of idolatry beneath which the false love of the world may ignorantly hide its own meaning, at any one temporal instant" (p. 347). "The Self may seek its self-expression explicitly in the form of rebellion. Nor is such a rebellious attitude by any means wholly evil. Conscious choice of a total evil is, indeed, impossible. For the Self, at its worst, seeks finality of self-expression, and seeks this self-expression through a life that is at once Other than its present Internal meaning, and perfected in its form and content. . . . As a fact I can only assert my finite Self by transforming myself; so that I actually obey, in some measure, even while I rebel. For the finite Self cannot seek its own, without passing over into new life. And there is self-sacrifice involved in even the most stubborn rebellion; and courage and endurance are exercised, unwillingly, even by the most cowardly of pleasure-seekers" (pp. 349, 350). "Now once considering the individual as acting in time, what you have a right to say to him is, that, if he intends evil results, . . . then, just in so far as he succeeds in carrying out his end, he produces what, at just that point of time, is indeed an actual evil" (p. 362). "Every evil deed must somewhere and at some time be atoned for, by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself" (p. 368).

I take the position to be this—moral evil has an eternal significance, but in its eternal significance it is so transcended that it is no longer evil. But, *sub specie temporis*, it is evil, as opposed to good, and must be atoned for before it is left behind. By such a view we combine the assertion that the universe is fundamentally good with a recognition of the phenomenal reality of evil which is quite sufficient for practical purposes—the only purposes for which we need be anxious to assert its reality. The theory and its exposition both seem to me to be admirable. My only doubt is as to the adequacy of Dr. Royce's conception of Eternity for such a purpose. Would not something more mystical and less temporal than an all-embracing Specious Present be required before the evilness of evil could be transcended?

"The Struggle with Evil" forms the subject of the ninth Lecture. "Every ill of human fortune is, presumably, either directly due to the magnitude and ideality of our finite plans, or else is more or less directly the expression of the morally defective intent of some human or extra-human moral agent, or of the inadequacy of such an agent to his own ideals" (pp. 387, 388). I would suggest that these are not so much alternatives as joint factors, both of which must be present in all cases. The evil fortune of any being must imply both an ideal which the facts hinder him from carrying out, and the facts which hinder him from carrying out the ideal.

This is followed by an admirable criticism of the forensic view of morals, which asserts that a man is only corrupted by his own sin, and ought only to suffer for his own sin. "In a sense the sin of every evil-doer among us taints all of us" (p. 389). And, again, the denial that any real evil falls on any man, except on account of the sins he has freely committed, reduces all attempts to help others to an absurdity (*cf.* pp. 402, 404).

The Lecture closes with an assertion that "our sorrows are identically God's own sorrows" (p. 408), and that "unless God knows sorrow, he knows not the highest good, which consists in the overcoming of sorrow" (p. 410). This supports my doubt as to the sufficiency of the Eternity ascribed to God by Dr. Royce for the purpose of completely transcending evil. And yet we have been told that the Absolute "transcends" evil (p. 396). Again God's Eternity is an all-embracing Specious Present. Therefore the evil, like everything else, is eternally present to him. If it is present as evil, and not as transcended and transmuted into what is not evil, how can he be said to have overcome it, or how can reality be held to be, *sub specie aeternitatis*, completely good?

The Union of God and Man forms the subject of the last lecture. The most important part of this lecture deals with Immortality. "The same considerations," we are told, "which imply the intimate union of every temporal instant's passing striving with the whole life of God, equally imply that an individual task which is ideal, which is unique, and which means the service of God in a series of deeds such as can never end without an essential failure of the task, can only be linked with God's life, and can only find its completion in this union with God, in an individual life which is the life of a conscious Self, and which is a deathless life" (p. 430).

This seems to me to be more than Dr. Royce is, on his own principles, entitled to assert. Every finite Self is included within the infinite Self, in a manner which apparently is analogous to the way in which different conscious moments are included within each finite Self. What guarantee have we that the different finite Selves are not transitory episodes in the infinite Self in the sense in which a particular mood, or a particular effort are transitory episodes in my finite Self? Each finite Self is, no doubt, unique. But the "passing striving" of each temporal instant is also unique,

and yet it passes. It is true, also,—at least on Dr. Royce's principles—that every moral task, when completed, gives birth to a fresh task. But I do not see that Dr. Royce has proved that the new task is a task for the same Self as the one who performed the previous task. And without this, the endless succession of tasks would be compatible with the transitoriness of all finite Selves.

This volume will satisfy even the high expectations which were raised by the First Series. If Idealists in general can combine the old courage with new caution so admirably as Dr. Royce does, they will have learnt a lesson which will be of great value to themselves and the world.

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*Principles of Western Civilisation*: By BENJAMIN KIDD. London: Macmillan & Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902. Price 15s. net.

MR. KIDD has endeavoured to write a very remarkable book, and he had succeeded in producing one which will attract attention. His aim has been nothing short of a new philosophy of history; and though there may be nothing in his work which will give it a claim to a place among philosophical classics, it is sufficiently stimulating in quality and bold in conception to arouse discussion and reflexion even outside philosophic circles. It handles in a broad and synoptic manner many of the profoundest, and some of the most insoluble, problems; it contains many just reflexions, many effective passages of rhetoric, and some which reveal insight: above all it is penetrated with a manifest seriousness and sincerity of purpose. It is essentially a book for edification. In the judgment of the more critical among its readers its chief defect will be found to lie in want of clearness—clearness both in thought and in style. It has been Mr. Kidd's misfortune to have served no apprenticeship in any school of exact and rigorous thinking; he has never submitted his postulates and working conceptions to an insistent elenchus. Too often he seems to be feeling after a thought, and satisfying himself with a formula; too often his language is of that impressionist type which indicates a mood of aspiration rather than a process of reasoning. If Mr. Kidd could be persuaded to devote more attention to perspicuity of diction much that is obscure in his thought would tend to disappear. Loose writing and loose thinking are inseparable allies.

The argument of the book opens with a severe exposure and a confident correction of the errors of Darwin, from whom Mr. Kidd attempts to extort a confession of the doctrine that in "the operation of the principle of Natural Selection the centre of significance is always in the present time" (p. 40), i.e. that the law should be regarded "simply in its relation to the interests of the individuals